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Abstract 
 
Much has been written about the home field advantage in sports. Baseball and 
softball are unusual games, in that the rules are explicitly different for home versus 
visiting teams, since by rule home teams bat second in each inning (they have “last 
licks”). This is generally considered to be an advantage, which seems to be 
contradicted by the apparent weakness of the home field advantage in baseball 
compared to that in other sports. In this paper we examine the effect of “last licks” 
on baseball and softball team success using neutral site college baseball and 
softball playoff games. We find little evidence of an effect in baseball, but much 
greater evidence in softball, related to whether a game is close late in the game. In 
softball games that are tied at the end of an inning, batting last seems to be 
disadvantageous later in the game, apparently related to the chances of the team 
scoring first to break the tie. By also examining games where one team was playing 
on its home field, we are able to say something about benefits from playing at 
home that are not related to “last licks.” 
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1. Introduction 
 
The existence of the “home field advantage” is well documented, in many sports, at many 
skill levels, in many parts of the world. Courneya and Carron (1992, page 13) define the 
home field advantage to be “the consistent finding that home teams in sports 
competitions win over 50% of the games played under a balanced home and away 
schedule.” The first systematic exploration of the home field advantage appears to have 
been by Schwartz and Barsky (1977), and its existence has been repeatedly supported 
since; the survey articles by Courneya and Carron (1992) and Nevill and Holder (1999) 
report evidence for it in college and professional baseball, high school, college, and 
professional football, professional hockey, high school, college, and professional 
basketball, professional soccer, high school track, county cricket, college softball, and 
college field hockey. 
Courneya and Carron (1992) identified four factors that could account for home 
field advantage: crowd factors, familiarity with local conditions, travel factors, and 
effects related to rule differences for the home versus the visiting team. This paper 
focuses on the last of these factors, although we will also say something about other 
aspects of home field advantage as well. Rule difference effects have not been 
investigated very much in the past, no doubt in part because there are few sports where 
such differences exist. One prominent exception is baseball (or softball). A baseball game 
is separated into nine separate innings, which are further split into halves (a softball game 
is split into seven innings). In each half-inning, one team is in the field, while the other 
team bats, having the opportunity to score. If the score is tied after nine innings in 
baseball (or after seven innings in softball), extra innings are played. In that case, the 
game continues until one team has more runs than the other at the end of the inning.  
Typically, the home team gets “last licks”; that is, they bat second in each of the 
innings. This corresponds to rule 4.02 of the Official Rules of Major League Baseball, 
which specifies the start of a game as follows: “The players of the home team shall take 
their defensive positions, the first batter of the visiting team shall take his position in the 
batter's box, the umpire shall call ‘Play’ and the game shall start” (Nemec, 1999, page 
233). During the latter part of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century the choice 
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of which team would bat first was made by the home team. It was customary for the 
home team to bat last in each inning, but this only became an official rule starting in the 
1950 season, after the Professional Baseball Official Playing Rules Committee met in 
New York City to codify the rules, issuing them on December 21, 1949. 
During the 19th century teams often preferred to bat first, so that they would have 
first opportunity to bat using the game ball, which was likely to be the only new ball used 
during the game (Nemec, 1999, pages 62-63). Home teams batted first at least 
occasionally as late as 1903, including a game between New York and Baltimore on 
April 21 (New York Times, 1903). There is even some evidence that the home team batted 
first by rule when major league baseball first came into existence with the formation of 
the National League in 1876, as an article in the Washington Post on June 24, 1936, 
while discussing an old-timers game being played in Boston, stated that “Rules which 
existed in 1876 will prevail, which means, among other things … the home team bats 
first” (United Press, 1936, page 19). 
Cricket is also a sport with two distinct phases of the game (where one or the other 
team is at bat), but in cricket the choice of who bats first is based on the captain’s choice 
after a coin toss. See Allsopp and Clarke (2004) for a discussion of effects related to 
which team bats first (among other things) in cricket matches.  A coin toss is also the rule 
given for deciding which team bats first in what are commonly considered to be the first 
rules of baseball, which Alexander Cartwright laid out on September 23, 1845 (open-
site.org/Sports/Baseball/History/Rules/1845__The_Original_Rules_of_Base
ball), and was the rule used in the major leagues from 1878 through 1886 (Nemec, 1999, 
page 62).  
Batting last in each inning of a baseball or softball game is viewed as an advantage, 
which leads to a bit of a puzzle, when it is noted that the home field advantage is 
generally smaller in baseball than it is in other sports (a roughly 54% winning percentage 
for major league baseball teams, compared to 60-70% figures for college and 
professional football, basketball, and hockey, for example). Could it be that, given two 
evenly matched teams, “last licks” really doesn’t help, and perhaps even hurts a team? 
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2. Effects related to which team bats first: Previous evidence 
 
In order to answer this question, we need to first understand why batting first or second in 
an inning could be advantageous to a team. Batting second (in the bottom of the inning) 
has long been viewed as an informational advantage because of the ability to implement 
offensive strategies in response to what the opposing team did in the top of the inning: 
using pinch hitters and pinch runners, playing for the tie or the win, and so on. An article 
in the Christian Science Monitor discussing the new rule regarding the order in which 
teams bat for the 1950 season noted that “Umpire Tom Connolly of the American 
League, who has been around for quite a while, said he never heard of a manager wanting 
to bat first, but that the home club has had that right since baseball was invented” 
(Associated Press, 1949, page 17). As a more recent example illustrating the wide 
acceptance of this position, columnist Tom Verducci castigated major league baseball 
commissioner Bud Selig in his column “Tom Verducci’s View” in the September 20, 
2004 issue of Sports Illustrated. Selig required that the Florida Marlins bat first in a game 
in Chicago against the Chicago Cubs, even though this was a makeup of a game 
originally scheduled for Miami that was played in Chicago because of Hurricane Frances 
(Verducci, 2004). Wright and House (1989) claimed that the strategic advantage of 
batting second “is so obvious as to need no verification” (page 131). Despite this, they 
estimated that “this accounts for about 5% of the home field advantage, certainly less 
than 10%” (page 132). It should be noted that these issues are most prominent in games 
that are close late in the game, since that is when strategic issues become more important.  
This supposed advantage, however, ignores that the team in the defensive position 
in the bottom half of the inning has the ability to implement defensive strategies based on 
what they did offensively in the top of the inning, which could cancel out any offensive 
advantage (Courneya and Carron, 1990). Further, it could be that the strategies 
implemented by the last-batting team do not, in fact, improve the chances of winning, 
despite beliefs to the contrary. Many of these so-called “small ball” strategies, such as the 
sacrifice bunt and the stolen base, have been found to be relatively ineffective in leading 
to more runs being scored, despite their popularity (see, for example, Bennett, 1998, and 
the references therein). One further possible factor is that the team batting last has a 
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potential disadvantage in games that are tied from the ninth inning on (seventh inning for 
softball), since the ace relievers used to secure victories (so-called “closers”) are often 
only brought into games when the team is ahead. The team batting last can never go 
ahead in games that are tied from the ninth inning on and then bring in a reliever (since 
they would have already won the game), so it might be that their best reliever never gets 
into the game. It should be noted that this use of relievers is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. 
Theories of psychological momentum imply that scoring first should provide an 
advantage (Courneya, 1990), and obviously (all things being equal) the team that bats 
first is more likely to score first. As Courneya and Carron (1990) note, however, it could 
be that preventing the opposing team from scoring could also provide psychological 
momentum. This could be particularly true for baseball or softball, since if the team 
batting last scores first, that means that the team batting first has already used their three 
outs for that inning in the top of the inning, and thus has fewer opportunities to come 
back. 
Given the expectation that other factors would probably have a stronger effect on 
home field advantage than the order in which the teams bat, teasing out the latter effect is 
a challenge, unless conditions can be found that remove the other effects. Courneya and 
Carron (1990) accomplished this by investigating win-loss records in a situation where 
the games were played on neutral fields. They examined data for 360 slo-pitch softball 
teams. Each team played 18 double-headers over the course of four months, where the 
teams playing alternated batting first in the two games of the double-header. The units of 
study were these double-headers, omitting those where the same team won both games, 
resulting in a total of 1120 double-headers. Note that in using this design, both games in 
all double-headers were either won by the team batting first, or by the team batting 
second. The authors examined the difference between the number of double-header 
victories by the team batting first and number of double-header victories by the team 
batting last, and found no evidence of any differences, including when looking at male 
players, female players, high ability players, low ability players, early season games, or 
late season games. The differences were assessed using chi-squared tests, and none were 
close to statistical significance. 
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Bray (2003) examined amateur baseball tournament games in Alberta, Canada. 
Each game either included an actual host team and visiting team (in the geographic 
sense), with the host team sometimes batting first and sometimes batting second, or two 
visiting teams (in the geographic sense). Bray found that the winning percentages of host 
teams (when playing visiting teams) were the same whether they batted first or second 
(57%), and the winning percentages of  visiting teams (when playing visiting teams) 
when batting first or second were virtually equal to each other (and 50%). Bray did find 
that when dividing the games by age group there were significant “last licks” effects for 
two groups, but these were in opposite directions (one favoring the team batting first, one 
favoring the team batting second), so the results did not provide any compelling evidence 
for either an advantage or disadvantage for “last licks.” 
 
3. The data and models 
 
In this work we investigate this question further by building on the work of Courneya and 
Carron (1990) and Bray (2003). The units of study are games played during the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I (men’s) baseball playoffs and 
(women’s) softball playoffs. The baseball playoffs take the form of 16 four-team double-
elimination Regional tournaments, followed by eight two-team double-elimination Super-
Regional tournaments, with the eight winners moving on to the double-elimination 
College World Series (CWS). Prior to 1999 there were eight four-team Regionals and no 
Super-Regionals. Although the Regionals and Super-Regionals typically are hosted by 
one of the teams, the CWS is always played at Rosenblatt Stadium in Omaha, Nebraska. 
Prior to 2003 the women’s softball playoffs were based on eight six-team double-
elimination Regionals (typically hosted by one of the teams), with the eight winners 
going to the double-elimination College World Series at Hall of Fame Stadium in 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; since 2003 the eight Regionals have included eight teams 
each. Since the players on teams that make the NCAA Division I playoffs are highly 
skilled, these data have the advantage of  removing home field advantage effects not 
related to the order in which teams bat for games played at a high level, something not 
possible in professional league play, where the home team always bats second. Note that 
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looking at both baseball and softball games allows comparison of effects related to 
gender (Gayton et al., 1987), although these are naturally confounded with the 
differences between the two games. 
In this context, the response of interest is not a continuous variable, but rather a 
binary one, corresponding to whether the first-batting team wins a game or the last-
batting team wins it. Least squares regression models are inappropriate for such data, so 
all of the analyses are based on logistic regression models. For each game i, define the 
response yi to be 0 if the first-batting team wins the game and 1 if the last-batting team 
wins. The logistic regression model assumes that yi follows a Bernoulli distribution, and 
relates the underlying probability pi to predictors {X1, …, Xk} through the relationship 
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This functional form is a natural one for probabilities, as it automatically accounts for the 
constraint that probabilities be bounded between 0 and 1. See Simonoff (2003, Chapter 9) 
for extensive discussion of this, and alternative, models for binary data. 
Data on each baseball playoff game and each softball playoff game from 1999-
2003 were gathered from the NCAA web site (web1.ncaa.org/ncaa/mainsearch.do). 
Of the 676 baseball games, there were 284 on neutral sites, while of the 508 softball 
games, 339 were played at neutral sites. For each game the runs scored by inning was 
recorded for both teams. In order to account for quality differences between teams, each 
team’s won-loss record was also noted, as well as its place on a national poll (or if it is 
unranked) taken just before the start of the NCAA playoffs (top 30 in the Collegiate 
Baseball Newspaper poll for baseball, and top 25 in the USA Today / National Fastpitch 
Coaches Association poll for softball), and whether each team qualified for the 
postseason as a conference champion (an automatic qualifier) or as an “at-large” team. 
The analyses here are based on predictors defined as the difference between the 
values for the two teams. The predictors used in the model are defined so that positive 
values favor the last-batting team, and negative values favor the first-batting team. In 
order to allow for teams that were unranked, we define the ranking variable through a 
series of indicator variables identifying if a team was ranked in the top 5, ranks 6 through 
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10, 11 through 15, and so on. Then, for each game, the differenced variable is defined as 
follows. Consider ranks 1 through 5. The variable Rank 1-5 is then 
   Rank 1-5 =  
1 if only the first-batting team is ranked 1 through 5
0 if neither team is ranked 1 through 5
0 if both teams are ranked 1 through 5
+1 if only the last-batting team is ranked 1 through 5
−⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Variables corresponding to the other ranks are defined similarly. Thus, if the two teams 
are in the same ranking group (including both being unranked), all of the rank variables 
equal zero, if just one team is ranked then exactly one of the variables is nonzero, and if 
both teams are ranked, and ranked in different ranking groups, then exactly two of the 
variables are nonzero. The “at-large” differenced predictor is defined so that the value 1 
corresponds to the first-batting team being a conference champion and the last-batting 
team being an at-large team, while the value -1 corresponds to the first-batting team 
being an at-large team and the last-batting team being a conference champion (the value 0 
implies that either both teams are conference champions or both are at-large teams). 
The benefit of using these differenced predictors is that any “last licks” effects are 
measured by the intercept term β0, since 
0
0
exp( )
1 exp( )
β
β+  
is the probability that the second-batting team wins the game, given the two teams are 
evenly matched (have the same winning percentage, the same ranking group, and are 
both either conference champions or at-large teams). If the game is being played at a 
neutral site, any observed effect can therefore be attributed to the benefit or cost of 
batting last. 
 
4. “Last licks” effects 
 
We start with an examination of the 284 neutral site baseball games. The fitted logistic 
regression for these data is summarized in Table 1 (including Wald z-statistics for 
significance of each coefficient). The one degree-of-freedom goodness-of-fit test 
proposed in Hosmer et al. (1997) does not indicate lack of fit for the model (p=.13). The 
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slope coefficients all have the expected signs. For example, if the last-batting team is 
ranked in the top 5, while the first-batting team is unranked, the last-batting team has 
estimated 14.59 =exp(2.680) times the odds of winning the game, holding all else in the 
model fixed. Difference in winning percentage is not a strong predictor in the model (as 
evidenced by the Wald z-statistic), which is not surprising given the different levels of 
strength of schedule for different teams. 
Interestingly, if two teams have the same winning percentage and are ranked 
similarly, an at-large team is favored to win the game over a conference champion, 
having 1.93 =exp(0.657) times the odds of winning. This is actually not surprising. Most 
conferences award their automatic bid to the winner of a postseason tournament, and in 
such cases it isn’t always the best team in the conference that wins. Winning the 
conference tournament might give the team a bit of a boost in the rankings (and losing it 
might hurt the ranking of an at-large qualifier), but that doesn’t change the inherent 
quality of the team. 
There is little evidence of a “last licks” effect. The estimated intercept of .104 
implies a winning probability of exp(.104) /[1 exp(.104)] .526+ = for the last-batting team 
in a game between evenly matched opponents. This is not close to being significantly 
different from .5. As noted earlier, many of the arguments for a last-batting advantage are 
relevant for close games, but there is little evidence here of different patterns for close 
games. Figure 1 plots the observed proportions of games won by the last-batting team 
when the game is tied at the end of each inning, with a reference line at .5 superimposed. 
These proportions do not suggest any consistent pattern related to closeness of games, 
with the possible exception of a higher winning percentage when the game is tied at the 
end of the 8th or 9th innings. The corresponding figures for major league baseball for the 
2001-2003 seasons (obtained using game-by-game records available at 
www.retrosheet.org), presented as the dashed line in the figure, also give no evidence 
of any effects related to the inning at which a game is tied. A fitted logistic regression to 
just the 32 neutral site baseball games tied at the end of the 8th or 9th innings (not shown) 
supports the lack of an effect, as there is little change in the estimated probability of the 
last-batting team winning for these games (it is now .541), and this probability is not 
close to being significantly different from .5.  
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Table 2 describes the softball data, based on 339 neutral site games. The model fits 
the data very well (p=.97). Once again an at-large team is favored over an evenly-
matched automatic qualifier, having 2.36=exp(0.858) times the odds of winning a game 
holding all else in the model fixed. Over all of the games, there is no evidence for any 
“last licks” effect, as the estimated probability of the last-batting team winning is .500.  
There is a very different pattern in close games, however. The winning percentage 
of the last-batting team drops dramatically for games that are tied at the end of the 3rd or 
later inning (Figure 2; note that the figure only goes out to 7 innings because that is the 
regulation length of softball games). It is possible that this figure could be misleading, 
since it does not account for the differences in abilities of the teams, but that does not 
seem to be the case. Table 3 gives the estimated probabilities of the last-batting team 
winning a game that has a specific scoring margin at the end of each inning, based on 
separate logistic regression fits for each game with that scoring margin. This table can be 
compared to Table 7 of Lindsey (1961), which gave corresponding probabilities for 
baseball games between evenly matched teams based on a model for scoring derived 
there. 
Evenly matched teams should have equal chances of winning a game that is tied at 
the end of an inning, implying values of .5 across the middle row of Table 3. If there was 
a consistent last-batting advantage or disadvantage these values would not be .5, but they 
would still be expected to be reasonably stable. Stern (1994) extended Lindsey’s results 
by modeling the scoring margin as a Brownian motion, possibly with drift. His Table 3 
gives selected values for a baseball game with home field (and hence last-batting team) 
advantage corresponding to .34 runs, and they imply a reasonably constant win 
probability for games that are tied at the end of the inning of .52-.53 (this is consistent 
with the results given here for major league baseball in Figure 1). 
In contrast, for these data, the estimated probability of the last-batting softball team 
winning a game tied at the end of an inning starts at .5, drops slowly for the first two 
innings, and then drops noticeably from the 3rd inning through the 6th inning. At least part 
of the reason for this seems to be the ability of each team to score first to break the tie 
(scoring first would certainly be expected to give a team an advantage). If the two teams 
are evenly matched and score independently of each other, the probability that the last-
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batting team scores first in an inning, given that a run is scored in that inning, is 1/3. 
(Define S to be a team scoring in the inning, and NS to be a team not scoring. There are 
three equally likely possibilities of the scoring pattern given a run is scored in the inning, 
{S, S}, {S, NS}, and {NS, S}, and in only one does the last-batting team score first.) For 
these data, the estimated probabilities of the last-batting team scoring first to break a tie 
(given in Table 4, and based on separate logistic regressions for games tied at the end of 
each inning) start higher than 1/3, and become progressively lower as the game goes on 
(but then return to roughly 1/3 for games tied at the end of the regulation 7 innings). It is 
reasonable to think that since the first-batting team breaks the tie more often than would 
be expected after innings 3 through 6, they would also win the game more often than 
would be expected (as it turns out they do).  
Why might the last-batting team perform so much less effectively in close games as 
the games go on? One could speculate that this might be related to the tendency of last-
batting teams to use “small ball” strategies in close games, which (as was noted earlier) 
might end up hurting the team. Given the relatively low scoring in softball games 
compared to baseball games (the median run total for the neutral site softball games is 5, 
while that for the neutral site baseball games is 12), it might be that these strategies are 
more attractive to coaches, but not necessarily more effective. Thus, if batting second 
does provide more information, apparently managers in these situations might be 
misusing it. It is not clear why the difficulties in scoring for the last-batting team are not 
apparent in games tied at the end of 7 innings (although it could simply be the small 
sample size), but in any event the close correspondence between breaking the tie first and 
ultimately winning the game seen in Tables 3 and 4 for all innings provides strong 
support for the belief that it is scoring first in tie games that drives much of what is going 
on. 
 
5. Home field effects 
 
The NCAA baseball and softball data also allow investigation of “true” home field 
effects, since in the Regional and Super-Regional rounds, one of the teams is the host 
team, and hence gets the benefits that come from playing at home. However, the host 
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team is scheduled to bat first in many of the games. In this section we examine some of 
those effects.  
Table 5 gives summaries of fitted logistic regressions for the probability of the last-
batting team winning in the 186 baseball games where the true home team batted first and 
196 games where the true home team batted last. The intercepts of the two models imply 
last-batting win probabilities of .516 and .536, respectively, assuming equally matched 
teams. Comparing this to the estimated probability in neutral site games, we see that the 
true home field effect is actually very small in NCAA playoff baseball, corresponding to 
only a 1-2 percentage point difference. This small an effect would probably come as a 
surprise to casual observers, since true home teams won 68.3% of the games where they 
batted first and 76.0% of the games where they batted last, but these overall proportions 
ignore team quality effects, which are important; the NCAA only awards host status to 
top teams, and the logistic regression fits show that it is this high quality that accounts for 
the bulk of their success as hosts. Interestingly, the estimated win probability of .536 for a 
true home team batting last is very similar to that for home teams in major league 
baseball’s World Series through 1997 (Stern, 1998), and is similar to the rate noted 
earlier for the regular season in major league baseball as well. 
The home field effect is much stronger in the softball data (Table 6). The intercepts 
of the two true home team models imply last-batting win probabilities of .389 (based on 
70 games where the home team batted first) and .587 (based on 96 games where the 
home team batted last), respectively. Comparing this to the estimated 50% chance in 
neutral site games, we see that the true home field effect is roughly 10 percentage points 
in NCAA playoff softball, a major advantage, and a sizable part of the gain implied by 
the marginal home team win proportions of 75.7% (home team batting first) and 74.0% 
(home team batting last), respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have used logistic regression models to examine the existence and 
magnitude of “last licks” and home field effects in baseball and softball. The NCAA 
baseball and softball playoff data provide an ideal framework for such analyses, since the 
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data include multiple games at neutral sites, games where a home team batted first, and 
games where a home team batted last.  We found relatively little evidence for any effects 
in the baseball data, but much stronger evidence for “last licks” and home field effects in 
the softball data, suggesting that more study of softball data could be a fruitful research 
area.  
A possible extension of the home field effects analysis performed here is an 
investigation of the so-called “home choke” effect. This concept, first suggested by 
Baumeister and Steinhilber (1984), hypothesizes that home teams that are close to victory 
perform poorly, being weighted down by “a burden of expectations, in the form of a 
supportive audience for a high-stakes performance” (Baumeister, 1995, page 644). 
Evidence for the existence of the “home choke” is decidedly mixed, with increasing 
supporting (see the references and discussion in Baumeister, 1995) and contradictory (see 
the references and discussion in Schlenker et al., 1995) evidence (see also Nevill and 
Holder, 1999). This question can be examined in the NCAA playoff data by studying the 
performance of home teams that are undefeated and are playing teams that are facing 
elimination, since they would presumably be subject to the home choke, if it exists. This 
would require more data than are available here, given the relative scarcity of such 
games. 
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Table 1. Fitted logistic regression for all neutral site baseball data (dependent variable is 
“second-batting team wins the game”; n=284). 
 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept 0.104 0.130 0.80 0.422 
Winning pct. 1.014 1.426 0.71 0.477 
Rank 1-5 2.680 0.623 4.30 <0.001 
Rank 6-10 1.637 0.538 3.04 0.002 
Rank 11-15 0.797 0.430 1.85 0.064 
Rank 16-20 0.533 0.329 1.62 0.105 
Rank 21-25 0.152 0.416 0.37 0.714 
Rank 26-30 0.375 0.365 1.03 0.304 
At-large 0.657 0.199 3.31 0.001 
 
 
 
 16 
Table 2. Fitted logistic regression for all neutral site softball data (dependent variable is 
“second-batting team wins the game”; n=339). 
 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept -0.002 0.126 -0.01 0.988 
Winning pct. 1.745 1.190 1.47 0.142 
Rank 1-5 2.048 0.442 4.63 <0.001 
Rank 6-10 1.211 0.398 3.05 0.002 
Rank 11-15 0.300 0.332 0.90 0.367 
Rank 16-20 0.715 0.317 2.26 0.024 
Rank 21-25 0.840 0.321 2.62 0.009 
At-large 0.858 0.207 4.15 <0.001 
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Table 3. Estimated probabilities for neutral site softball data of the last-batting team 
winning the game, based on scoring margin at the end of each specified inning. Scoring 
margin is given as the number of runs the last-batting team is ahead or behind. 
 
Scoring 
margin 
   Inning     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
≥ 2  .965 .973 .977 .983 .988 1.000  
1  .656 .739 .729 .783 .867 .874  
0 .500 .480 .460 .391 .352 .415 .335 .496 
-1  .251 .233 .266 .258 .173 .163  
≤ -2  .000 .000 .059 .025 .000 .000  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated probabilities for neutral site softball data of the last-batting team 
scoring the next run to break a tie at the end of each specified inning. Equal probabilities 
of scoring for each team would imply values of .333 in each entry. 
 
   Inning     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
.457 .420 .412 .353 .285 .348 .242 .320 
 
 
 18 
Table 5. Fitted logistic regression for true home field baseball data (dependent variable is 
“second-batting team wins the game”). 
 
True home team bats first (n=186) 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept 0.063 0.276 0.23 0.818 
Winning pct. 0.813 2.070 0.39 0.694 
Rank 1-5 1.741 0.637 2.73 0.006 
Rank 6-10 1.236 0.540 2.29 0.022 
Rank 11-15 0.525 0.435 1.21 0.228 
Rank 16-20 0.759 0.494 1.54 0.124 
Rank 21-25 0.388 0.499 0.78 0.437 
Rank 26-30 -0.121 0.566 -0.21 0.831 
At-large -0.057 0.259 -0.22 0.826 
 
 
True home team bats last (n=196) 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept 0.143 0.279 0.51 0.609 
Winning pct. -0.648 2.376 -0.27 0.785 
Rank 1-5 2.318 0.630 3.68 <0.001 
Rank 6-10 1.911 0.592 3.23 0.001 
Rank 11-15 1.307 0.486 2.69 0.007 
Rank 16-20 1.840 0.573 3.21 0.001 
Rank 21-25 1.064 0.540 1.97 0.049 
Rank 26-30 0.208 0.735 0.28 0.777 
At-large 1.022 0.301 3.39 0.001 
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Table 6. Fitted logistic regression for true home field softball data (dependent variable is 
“second-batting team wins the game”). 
 
True home team bats first (n=70) 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept -0.453 0.464 -0.98 0.329 
Winning pct. 0.144 3.861 0.04 0.970 
Rank 1-5 3.156 1.419 2.23 0.026 
Rank 6-10 0.282 0.981 0.29 0.774 
Rank 11-15 0.582 0.983 0.59 0.554 
Rank 16-20 0.807 1.128 0.72 0.474 
Rank 21-25 -1.506 0.942 -1.60 0.110 
At-large 0.079 0.571 0.14 0.890 
 
 
True home team bats last (n=96) 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard error z p 
 
Intercept 0.351 0.359 0.98 0.329 
Winning pct. 7.673 3.243 2.37 0.018 
Rank 1-5 0.876 0.920 0.95 0.341 
Rank 6-10 0.374 0.891 0.42 0.675 
Rank 11-15 0.749 0.783 0.96 0.339 
Rank 16-20 1.098 0.750 1.46 0.143 
Rank 21-25 1.357 0.769 1.76 0.078 
At-large 0.196 0.386 0.51 0.611 
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Figure 1. Plot of observed proportions of games won by last-batting team in neutral site 
baseball games when the game is tied at the end of each inning (solid line). The 
corresponding figures for major league baseball during the 2001-2003 seasons are given 
as the dashed line. 
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Figure 2. Plot of observed proportions of games won by last-batting team in neutral site 
softball games when the game is tied at the end of each inning. 
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